ABSTRACT This paper considers secure transmission design for multiple-input-single-output multiple multi-antenna eavesdroppers networks with finite alphabet inputs. To improve the achievable secrecy rate, the joint optimization of beamforming vector and transmitting power is studied. We transform the multivariable problem into a single-variable problem, and then derive the beamforming vector and the transmitting power using one-dimensional search method. Specially, the secure transmission designs in the extremely signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime are investigated. In the low SNR regime, the problem of beamforming design is transformed into a semi-definite programming problem, which can be handled by interior-pointbased methods, and the optimal transmitting power is obtained. Besides, two different secure schemes, which are zero-force beamforming scheme and joint beamforming and jamming scheme, are proposed to increase the achievable secrecy rate at high SNR. Numerical results demonstrate that the proposed schemes significantly improve the secrecy performance of the system. INDEX TERMS Physical layer security, beamforming, power control, finite alphabet inputs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security is one of the most sensitive concerns in wireless communication where the wireless medium is open. Though traditional key-based cryptographic technologies [1] can be utilized to protect the wireless systems, they are being challenged with explosive growth of the number of users. From the perspective of information theory, the security issues can be handled by physical layer techniques without secret keys, which has attracted tremendous attention [2] - [10] . In the seminal work [2] , Wyner presented the degraded wiretap channel model and provided the concept of ''secrecy capacity'', which is defined as the supremum of the rate difference between source-destination channel and source-eavesdropper channel. Extending Wyner's results, the secrecy capacities of Gaussian wiretap channel and the general non-degraded wiretap channel were studied in [3] and [4] . Furthermore, Khisti and Wornell [5] , [6] analyzed the secrecy capacity of Gaussian wiretap channel model and pointed out that the secrecy capacity can be achieved with Gaussian wiretap code.
It is worth noticing that most existing researches on physical layer security are based on ideal Gaussian input assumption, which is difficult to be implemented into the real systems. The practical communication signals are often taken from the finite-alphabet constellation, such as pulse amplitude modulation (PAM), phase shift keying (PSK) modulation or quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM). The finite alphabet inputs greatly depart from the Gaussian distribution, which may result in enormous performance loss when the Gaussian scheme is implemented into the real system with finite alphabet inputs [11] , [12] . As revealed in [12] , the secrecy rate of Gaussian scheme decreases to zero in the high SNR regime without power control. Therefore, there is an increasing interest in linear precoding design based on finite alphabet inputs for enhancing the physical layer security, recently [13] - [18] . Wu et al. [13] studied the optimal linear precoding design for multiple-input-mutipleoutput multiple antennas eavesdropper (MIMOME) wiretap channel, and proposed an iterative algorithm based on gradient descent method to search the optimal precoder. To reduce the computational complexity, a novel per-group design based on generalized singular value decomposition (GSVD) was developed to guarantee the highest secrecy rate in the high SNR regime for large-scale MIMOME networks [14] . Furthermore, the joint precoding and jamming schemes were proposed to strengthen the physical layer security of MIMOME wiretap channels [15] , [16] . Based on brand-and-bound methods, the linear precoding designs for improving achievable secrecy rates of cognitive radio networks and cognitive multiple-access networks were investigated in [17] and [18] . Nevertheless, the above works only consider the scenario with a single eavesdropper, scarce works have investigated the secure transmission design for the scenario with multiple eavesdroppers [19] . The work of [19] studied the secrecy rate optimization problem for multiple-input-single-output (MISO) secrecy channel with multiple multiantenna eavesdroppers under Gaussian input. Chu et al. [19] transformed the secrecy rate optimization problem into a second-oder cone program, and derived the closed-form solution for the case with a single eavesdropper using Lagrange dual method. In the presence of multiple eavesdroppers, the achievable secrecy rate is dominated by the eavesdropper with maximal mutual information, which leads to that the expression of achievable secrecy rate is unclear and thus makes the secure transmission design more complicated. To the best of our knowledge, the linear precoding design based on finite alphabet inputs for enhancing physical layer security of MISO secrecy channel with multiple multi-antenna eavesdroppers is still missing.
In this work, we study the secure transmission design with finite alphabet inputs for a MISO secrecy channel, which is comprised of a source, a destination, and multiple multiantenna eavesdroppers. In contrast to the Gaussian input assumption, it may not be optimal to transmit the signal with full power in real communication system [12] , [13] . Therefore, the joint beamforming and power control schemes are proposed to enhance the physical layer security of MISO secrecy channel. Simulation results show that significant performance gains in terms of secrecy rate are achieved by the proposed schemes compared to the conventional Gaussian scheme. Consequently, the main contributions are summarized as follows:
• The expression of the achievable secrecy rate with finite alphabet inputs in the presence of multiple multi-antenna eavesdroppers is obtained, which is a joint function of transmitting power and beamforming vector. By transforming the achievable secrecy rate into a singlevariable function, we derive the transmitting power and beamforming vector for improving the achievable secrecy rate through one-dimensional search method.
• We analyze the achievable secrecy rate in the extremely SNR regime. By utilizing the approximated achievable secrecy rate in the low SNR regime, we transform the problem of beamforming design into a semi-definite programming (SDP) problem, which can be efficiently addressed by interior-point-based methods. Besides, it is optimal to transmit the message with full power at low SNR.
• At high SNR, it is optimal to adopt the zero-force beamforming scheme when the source has more antennas than all eavesdroppers, and we derive the minimal transmitting power for zero-force beamforming scheme under a secrecy rate constraint. For the scenario where the source has less or equal antennas than all eavesdroppers, the achievable secrecy rate can be further improved by transmitting artificial noise to deteriorate the maximal signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of eavesdroppers. The rest of the work is organized as follows. Section II presents the system model. Section III studies the joint beamforming design and power control in detail. Secure transmission designs in the extremely SNR regime are investigated in Section IV. The numerical results are illustrated in Section V, and Section VI summarizes the main results.
Notation : Boldface uppercase letters, boldface lowercase letters, and italics stand for matrices, column vectors, and scalars, respectively. The superscripts (.) T , (.) * and (.) H denote transpose, conjugate and conjugate transpose operations respectively. |.| designates norm of scalar and ||.|| denotes the Frobenius norm of the vector. Tr(.) denotes the trace operations; I N and 0 represent a N × N identity matrix and a zero matrix of appropriate dimensions, respectively. E{.} stands for the statistical expectation with respect to its variable; CN (µ, σ 2 ) designates the circularly symmetric, complex Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance σ 2 . The base two logarithm is denoted as log 2 (.).
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a MISO secrecy channel, which consists of a source node S, a legitimate destination D, and J independent eavesdroppers E j J j=1
, as depicted in Fig. 1 . The source and jth eavesdropper E j are equipped with N S and N E j antennas, respectively, while the destination is equipped with a single antenna. We assume that the full channel state information (CSI) is available at the source node, even including CSI of eavesdroppers' channels [20] , [21] . This assumption corresponds to the scenario where eavesdroppers are also legitimate users but they are not the intended destinations. In addition, the thermal noise at each node is assumed to be complex Gaussian distributed with zero-mean and variance σ 2 , i.e., CN (0, σ 2 ).
Let y D denote the received signal from the source to the destination, which is expressed as
where p represents the transmitting power of the source, h ∈ C N S ×1 denotes the channel vector from the source to the destination. w ∈ C N S ×1 is the beamforming vector, which fulfills w H w ≤ 1. x stands for the transmitted signal, which follows E x {|x| 2 } = 1, and n D ∼ CN (0, σ 2 ) is complex Gaussian noise. The signal received at jth eavesdropper E j is denoted by y E j ∈ C N E j ×1 , which is given by
where G j ∈ C N E j ×N S denotes the channel matrix from the source to jth eavesdropper E j , n E j ∼ CN (0, σ 2 I N E j ) represents complex Gaussian noise. Utilizing the maximal-ratio combining (MRC) technique, the received signal at jth eavesdropper E j can be equivalently written asỹ
where
Consequently, the achievable secrecy rate is formulated as [23] 
where the achievable secrecy rate is dominated by the eavesdropper with maximal mutual information. Note that the achievable secrecy rate is a function of the beamforming vector w and the transmitting power p, then our goal is to maximize the achievable secrecy rate via w and p subject to the power constraints, which can be represented as
where P 0 is the power budget for the source node.
III. INCREASING THE ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE VIA BEAMFORMING DESIGN AND POWER CONTROL
It is difficult to deal with the problem in (7) due to that the problem in (7) is a multi-variable optimization problem.
To address this issue, we try to convert the achievable secrecy rate into a single-variable function, and then choose the one with highest secrecy rate as the final solution. Firstly, we define C(β) as the maximum of the following problem,
Note that the matrix h * h T is a positive semi-definite matrix and its maximal eigenvalue is h 2 , thus we have β ∈ [0, 1]. The problem in (8) consists of two subproblems: beamforming design and power control.
, which is independent with the beamforming vector w. Therefore, the subproblem of beamforming design in (8) can be reformulated as
Due to that the value of I (x;ỹ E j ) only depends on
, the problem in (9) is identical to the following problem,
where p/σ 2 does not affect the solution of the problem in (10) . Thus, the problem in (10) can be simplified as
Denote φ = max
Let W = ww H , where W is a N S × N S symmetric matrix with rank one, the problem in (12) can be equivalently written as
where W 0 stands for that W is a symmetric positive semidefinite (PSD) matrix. Dropping the constraint of rank one, the problem in (13) is degraded as
The problem in (14) is an instance of semidefinite programming [25] , which can be efficiently handled using interior-point-based software packages, such as SeDuMi [26] . The worse-case complexity of solving the problem in (14) is O max {J + 2, N S } 4 (N S ) 1/2 log 2 (1/ε) when an accuracy ε is given [25] . However, the solution W obtained from (14) may not be rank-one. If W is of rank one, then its principle eigenvector is the solution of the original problem in (12) . Otherwise, randomization techniques [27] can be utilized to deal with this problem.
B. POWER CONTROL
By solving the problem in (14) and using randomization techniques [27] , one can obtain the beamforming vector, which is denoted as w . Defining g max (β) = max j G j w , we have max
. Thus, the subproblem of power control in (8) is reformulated as
Proposition 1: The optimal value of p in problem (15) is derived as follows
where the value of p 1 can be obtained by solving the following equation,
where mmse(·) is the minimum mean-square error (MMSE) function [11] .
Proof: See Appendix A. Substituing w and p into (8), one can derive the value of C(β). Hence, the achievable secrecy rate is transformed into a single-variable function. The problem in (7) is identical to the following problem,
The problem in (18) only refers to the optimization over β, which can be efficiently solved using one-dimensional search method. Specifically, one can divide the interval [0, 1] into L values and select the ''best'' one as the final solution. Hence, the complexity is O max {J + 2, N S } 4 (N S ) 1/2 L .
IV. SECURE TRANSMISSION DESIGNS IN THE EXTREMELY SNR REGIME
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A. MAXIMIZE THE DIFFERENCE OF SNRs AT LOW SNR
In the low SNR regime, i.e., P 0 /σ 2 → 0, one can obtain the approximated mutual information by utilizing the first order expansion of mutual information [28] , which are given by
Therefore, the problem in (7) at low SNR can be expressed as
Note that the value of p heavily depends on the beamforming vector w, therefore, we firstly consider the subproblem of beamforming design.
For an arbitrarily given p, the subproblem of beamforming design in (21) is formulated as
Proposition 2: The problem in (22) is identical to the following problem,
Proof: See Appendix B. By removing the rank-one constraint, one can obtain the following SDP problem,
which can be efficiently solved using SeDuMi [26] , and the complexity is O max {J + 1, N S } 4 (N S ) 1/2 log 2 (1/ε) . With the solutionW obtained from (24) , its principle eigenvector should be chosen as the beamforming vector ifW is a rankone matrix. Otherwise, the beamforming vector should be derived using randomization techniques [27] ifW has higher rank.
Plugging the beamforming vector into (21), the optimal transmitting power at low SNR can be easily derived as follows,
Thus, it is optimal to transmit the signal with full power in the low SNR regime when w H h * h T w > max j w H G H j G j w. Otherwise, the transmission from the source to the destination should be terminated.
B. SECURE TRANSMISSION DESIGN AT HIGH SNR
In the high SNR regime, i.e., P 0 /σ 2 → ∞, the secure transmission design relies on the number of antennas equipped at source and eavesdroppers. In this subsection, two special scenarios are considered and the corresponding secure schemes are proposed to improve the achievable secrecy rate.
1) SCENARIO 1
When N S > J j=1 N E j , it is optimal to adopt the zero-force scheme at high SNR for achieving perfect secrecy [13] . The subproblem of beamforming design subject to the zero-force constraint is formulated as
where I (x;ỹ E j ) = 0 when ||G j w|| = 0. Keep in mind that I (x; y D ) is an increasing function of p σ 2 w H h * h T w [24] , then the problem in (26) is identical to the following problem,
For brevity, we define matrix
Then the beamforming vector w can be expressed as w = Ub, where
is an orthonormal basis of the null space of the matrix G,
Hence, the problem in (27) can be equivalently written as
The optimal b is the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of the matrix U H h * h T U, besides, the maximum of the problem in (28) is the largest eigenvalue of the matrix U H h * h T U. Note that the matrix U H h * h T U is rankone, the maximum of the problem in (28) is equivalent to Tr U H h * h T U . Therefore, the expression of the achievable secrecy rate with zero-force constraint is given by
Note that I x; pTr U H h * h T U x + n D is upper bounded, which leads to serious power waste without power control in the high SNR regime. Therefore, it is reasonable to minimize the transmitting power when the achievable secrecy rate is above the threshold. Thus, the problem of minimizing the transmitting power subject to the secrecy rate constraint is formulated as
where C th ∈ (0, log 2 M ] is the threshold. Proposition 3: The minimal transmitting power p of the problem in (30) is given by
where λ > 0 and it satisfies
Proof: See Appendix C.
2) SCENARIO 2
When N S ≤ J j=1 N E j , the null space of eavesdroppers' channels dose not exist. To further improve the achievable secrecy rate, it is reasonable to transmit artificial noise in the null space of the source-destination channel for jamming the eavesdroppers.
By solving the problem in (18) , one can derive the optimal value of β, which is denoted by β . Then we can derive w and p by substituting β into (14) and (16), respectively. With the obtained w and p, the transmitting signal can be denoted as
is an orthonormal basis of the null space of h T , f ∈ C (N S −1)×1 satisfies f H f ≤ 1, z ∼ CN (0, 1) is the artificial noise. Due to that the artificial noise is completely nulled out in the direction of the destination, the received signal at the destination keeps constant. On the other hand, the received signal at jth eavesdropper E j is reformulated as
Utilizing the MRC technique, the received signal at jth eavesdropper E j can be equivalently written as
The artificial noise only affects the value of max j I (x;ỹ E j ).
Thus, the problem of maximizing the achievable secrecy rate through artificial noise is identical to the problem of minimizing max j I (x;ỹ E j ) via artificial noise, which is formulated as
Denote SINR E j as the SINR of jth eavesdropper, which is given by
Note that I (x;ỹ E j ) is determined by SINR E j and it is the increasing function of SINR E j . Thus, the problem in (35) is identical to the following problem,
The problem in (37) can be reformulated as
, the problem in (38) is identical to the following problem,
Substituting (36) into (39), the problem in (39) is equivalently written as
Introducing a new matrix F = ff H , where F is a (N S − 1) × (N S − 1) matrix with rank one, then the problem in (40) can be transformed into the following problem, min
where F 0 stands for that F is a symmetric PSD matrix.
VOLUME 6, 2018
Using semidefinite relaxation (SDR) technique [25] , one can obtain the following SDP problem, min
Similarly, the problem in (42) also can be addressed using SeDuMi [26] , and the worst-case complexity is O max {J + 1, N S − 1} 4 (N S − 1) 1/2 log 2 (1/ε) . Unfortunately, the solution F obtained from (42) generally will not be rank-one. If F is of rank one, the eigenvector corresponding to its largest eigenvalue is the solution of the original problem in (38). Otherwise, we should extract f from F using randomization techniques [27] .
Note that using additional power to transmit artificial noise for deteriorating the maximal SINR of eavesdroppers, which further improves physical layer security of the system.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, numerical results are presented to illustrate the efficiency of the proposed schemes. In the simulation setup, the channel coefficients of h and G j are randomly generated as complex Gaussian variable with zero mean and unit variance. The variance of the thermal noise is set as σ 2 = 1 and we define SNR as SNR = P 0 /σ 2 . In addition, we set N E j = 2 for j = 1, 2, . . . , J . In Fig. 2 , we compare the secrecy rate performance with different schemes and different modulations when N S = 5 and J = 2. For brevity, the scheme proposed in Section III is denoted as ''one-dimensional search'' method. We denote the secure transmission scheme based on Gaussian input assumption as ''Gaussian design'' [5] , where the transmitting power is chosen as p = P 0 and the beamforming vector is the one with highest secrecy rate selected from the set {w j } J j=1 , in which w j is the eigenvector of the pair
As can be seen from Fig. 2 , we observe that significant performance gain in terms of secrecy rate is achieved by the one-dimensional search method compared to the Gaussian design. The secrecy rate of Gaussian design deceases to zero in moderate-to-high SNR regime. This is because that eavesdroppers are able to decode the transmitted message accurately when the transmitting power is sufficiently high. Thus, we should select the transmitting power based on the finite alphabet inputs for the real system rather than Gaussian input. 3 depicts the effects of the number of eavesdroppers on the achievable secrecy rate under quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK) when N S = 5. Obviously, the secrecy rate performances of one-dimensional search method and Gaussian design decrease as the number of eavesdroppers increases. When N S ≤ J j=1 N E j , it is impossible to null out the confidential message in the direction of all eavesdroppers, Therefore, the secrecy rate performance loss becomes more serious with the increasing number of eavesdroppers, which is shown in Fig. 3 . Fig. 4 illustrates the secrecy rate performance of different schemes in the low SNR regime under QPSK input when N S = 5 and J = 2. Here we denote the scheme proposed in Section IV-A as ''maximal SNRs' difference'' scheme. It can be observed from Fig. 4 that the maximal SNRs' difference scheme outperforms the Gaussian design in the low SNR regime. Besides, the secrecy rates of one-dimensional search method and maximal SNRs' difference scheme match well at low SNR. scheme'' and the threshold is set as C th = log 2 M bit/s/Hz. The secure energy efficiency (SEE) is defined as
As pointed out in [13] , the zero-force scheme is optimal at high SNR when N S > J j=1 N E j . From Fig. 5 , we observe that the zero-force scheme achieves the maximal secure energy efficiency in the high SNR regime. The one-dimensional search method performs best in the low and medium SNR regime, while it is slightly smaller than the zero-force scheme at high SNR. This is because that the beamforming vector obtained from randomization techniques [27] is near-optimal, which partly deteriorates the secure energy efficiency performance. Due to that the achievable secrecy rate is upper bounded under finite alphabet inputs assumption, the secure energy efficiency of Gaussian design decreases to zero in the high SNR regime without power control. 6 shows the effects of artificial noise on achievable secrecy rate with different modulations when N S = 5 and J = 3. Here we denote the scheme proposed for coping with the scenario 2 as ''jamming scheme''. In the high SNR regime, the secrecy performance of the system is further strengthened by utilizing the artificial noise to minimize the maximal SINR of eavesdroppers, which can be seen from Fig. 6 .
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigated secure transmission design with finite alphabet inputs for improving the physical layer security of MISO secrecy channel in the presence of multiple multi-antenna eavesdroppers. By reducing the multi-variable problem to a single-variable problem, we obtained the beamforming vector and the transmitting power for increasing the achievable secrecy rate. Besides, the achievable secrecy rate at extremely SNR was analyzed. At low SNR, we revealed that the problem of beamforming design can be transformed into a SDP problem, which can be efficiently solved using interior-point-based methods. In the high SNR regime, we showed that the highest secure energy efficiency is achieved by the zero-force beamforming scheme when the source has more antennas than all eavesdroppers. Furthermore, we studied using artificial noise to minimize the maximal SINR of eavesdroppers when all eavesdroppers have more or equal antennas than the source does, which further improves the achievable secrecy rate of the system. Simulation results validate the efficiency of the proposed schemes.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
When h 2 β ≤ g max (β), i.e, the source-destination channel is worse than the best eavesdroppers' channel,
for arbitrarily given p, which leads to C = 0. Hence, it is optimal to set p = 0 when h 2 β ≤ g max (β).
When h 2 β > g max (β), the optimal value p within [0, P 0 ] is the solution of the following equation,
For a specific Gaussian channel y = √ snrx + η, where snr denotes the signal-to-noise ratio and η ∼ CN (0, 1), a fundament relationship between mutual information and MMSE has been revealed in [24] , which is given by
Utilizing this relationship (45), we can obtain the following results,
Substituting (46) and (47) 
